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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(e)(ii). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether The Hearing Before The Commission To Determine 
Zissi's Tax Liability Under The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act Was A 
Civil Proceeding. 
II. Whether The Federal Criminal Exclusionary Rule Should Be 
Extended To Apply To A State Civil Tax Proceeding To Exclude 
Evidence Of Possession Of Drugs Being Taxed Under The Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act. 
III. Whether The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act That Does Not Require 
A Drug Dealer To Give His Name Address, Social Security Number, 
Or Other Identifying Information On Stamp Purchase Forms Violates 
the Privilege Against Self-incrimination. 
IV. Whether Criminal Protections Against Cruel And Unusual 
Punishment Should Extend To Tax Proceedings For Violation Of The 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act. 
V. Whether The Commission Erred In Construing The Tax Rate 
Provisions Of The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act To Tax Petitioner's 
Drugs In Tablet Form As Units and Not By Weight. 
VI. Whether The Commission Erred By Holding That The Term 
"Dosage Unit" Means One Separate Tablet. 
VII. Whether The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act Applies So As To 
Single Petitioner Out And Treat Him Differently Than Other Drug 
Dealers Possessing Amphetamines In Tablet Form. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions 
are dispositive in this case: 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
Utah Const, art. I § 12 
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-101 
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-103 
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-105 
Utah Code Ann. 59-19-106. 
The constitutional provisions are attached as 
Appendix A. The statutory provisions are attached as Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 4, 1988, five officers from the Utah County 
Sheriff's Department conducted a driver's license checkpoint. 
(R. 99, 115, 251). The checkpoint was established on State Road 
73 on the main highway leading out of Fairfield. (R. 99). 
Petitioner Zissi's vehicle stopped at the checkpoint, where one 
of the officers smelled "a strong odor of marihuana coming from 
inside the vehicle." (R. 102). 
Zissi, Carla Sine, and Darren Reese were in the cab of 
the truck. (R. 103). Upon questioning, Zissi denied having any 
marihuana. (R. 102). The officer requested that Zissi pull his 
vehicle off to the side of the road, where he was asked to 
surrender his marihuana. (R. 102-3). Zissi reached into a 
pocket seat cover in the vehicle and produced a baggie of 
marihuana for the officer; he also retrieved from the ashtray the 
marihuana cigarette that he had just finished smokina. fP m*\ 
The officer, feeling that probable cause had been 
established, searched Zissi's vehicle for other illegal 
contraband. (R. 103). A shaving bag was found directly behind 
Zissi's seat that contained amphetamine tablets and a flashlight 
that Zissi later identfied as his flashlight. (R. 104, 149, 259, 
264). Darren Reese (passenger) in an affidavit given later swore 
that the amphetamines belonged to Zissi, and that Zissi had told 
him that they were his. (R. 180). 
There were no Utah drug stamps attached or contained 
with the tablets as required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
105 (Supp. 1988). (R. 94). Behind the middle of the truck seat 
a briefcase was found that contained $24,440. (R. 117, 252). 
Zissi stipulated at the hearing before the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Commission") that the briefcase was his. (R. 94). 
The Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Title 59, 
Chapter 01, Sections 701, 702, Utah Code Ann., 1953, served Zissi 
with "Notice And Demand For Payment Of Tax Under Declaration Of 
Taxes In Jeopardy". (R. 195-8, 221). They found that the 
official stamps required under the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act" 
(the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101 (Supp. 1988), had not 
been attached and that the taxes were due and owing. 
Tax on eleven units of amphetamine was assessed at 
The total number of pills taxed was 550. The Act provides for 
assessment "on each 50 units of a controlled substance that is 
not sold by weight. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103(1)(c) 
$2,000 per gram for a total of $22,000 due in taxes, with an 
additional $22,000 penalty to be collected as part of the tax as 
required by the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(1) (Supp. 
1988), for a total amount due of $44,000. (R. 196). Warrants 
for the delinquent taxes were executed and recorded. (R. 226-9). 
Zissi petitioned the Commission for redetermination of the taxes 
and penalty assessed against him. (R. 235). 
At the hearing before the Commission, Zissi argued that 
evidence of his amphetamines should be excluded. (R. 165). The 
Commission argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply. 
(R. 175). 
Both parties presented witnesses to establish the 
meaning of "dosage units" as set forth in the Act. Mr. J. Craig 
o 
Johnson, Director of Pharmacy Services at LDS Hospital, and a 
pharmacist there since 1970, testified that "[a] dosage unit 
would be one tablet." (R. 153). Exhibit 3 was entered into 
evidence in support of Dr. Johnson's testimony. (R. 182). In 
distinguishing a "dosage unit" from a "dosage," he stated that 
Cont. Cont. (Supp. 1988). Thus, 550 pills divided by 50 
dosage units =11 units of taxable amphetamine. 
Johnson graduated from pharmacy school in 1960 and began work 
for LDS Hospital in 1970. (R. 152). Johnson has qualified as an 
expert and testified in federal and state courts concerning 
pharmacy related matters. (R. 152). Johnson also testified that 
he was the director of pharmacy in four different hospitals. (R. 
156). Zissi's counsel did not object to his qualification as an 
expert. (R. 152). 
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M[a] dosage would [be] the amount a person took at one time." 
(R. 153). A "unit dose is the way things are packaged." (R. 
155). He further stated that this is common parlance in the 
medical field. (R. 155). 
3 
Detective Kendra Hurlin of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department testified that a dosage unit is an 
individual tablet or capsule. (R. 159-60). She also testified 
that she has never seen amphetamine tablets sold by weight, but 
had seen them sold as individual units. (R. 158). She further 
testified that amphetamines sold in powder form are different 
chemically and in color to amphetamines sold in tablet form. (R. 
4 
159). Contrary to the other two witnesses, Loni Deland, a 
defense attorney, testified that a dosage unit is equivalent to a 
dose, i.e. the amount a person would shoot into his arm at one 
time. (R. 143). Deland also testified, however, that he did not 
recall ever purchasing any amphetamines by weight when they were 
Hurlin, at the time of the hearing, had been employed with the 
Sheriff's office for over 11 years, and had been a detective 
assigned to narcotics for almost 3 years. (R. 158). She has 
received narcotics training at "POST" from the DEA, and on-the-
job training from other officers with prior experience. (R. 
158). 
4 
At the time of the hearing, Deland had been a member of the 
Utah State Bar for 11^ years. (R. 136). Prior to that he had 
worked 6 years for the United States Treasury, Bureau of Customs 
as an agent. (R. 136). For the three years prior to that he 
worked as a narcotics agent for the State of Utah, and the year 
before that he had worked as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff. 
Id. 
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in pill form. (R. 138). 
Based on this testimony, the Commission found that the 
tax assessment of $44,000 was correct. It entered factual 
findings that 550 tablets of amphetamine, an illegal substance, 
belonged to Zissi (R. 96); no drug stamps were attached to the 
amphetamines (R. 96); the term dosage unit is equivalent to one 
pill (R. 7); amphetamines such as ones at issue are sold as pills 
and not by weight. (R. 7). The Commission further found that 
the controlled substance was in pill form, and when in pill form 
it is "sold by pill and not by weight." (R. 10). 
It is under these facts that this appeal comes before 
the Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Zissi's hearing before the Commission was a civil tax 
proceeding. Zissi argues that it was a quasi-criminal hearing. 
The respondent contends criminal protections do not apply to a 
civil tax proceeding. Case law and rules of statutory 
construction show that tax portions of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Act are civil in nature. 
The question of whether a penalty is civil or criminal 
is a matter of statutory construction that is analyzed on two 
levels. First, the Court should examine whether the legislature 
indicated a preference for one label or the other. Second, the 
statutory scheme should be examined to see if it is so punitive 
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in either purpose or effect as to negate the legislative label. 
The taxes and penalties collected by the Commission are clearly 
civil tax penalties. The Act is not so punitive in nature as to 
negate the civil penalties. Where both a civil and criminal 
penalty are found in a statute, the force of the argument that 
the civil penalty is really a criminal penalty is diluted. Both 
civil and criminal penalties are found in the Act. 
The exclusionary rule does not apply to a civil tax 
proceeding. That form of relief is inconsistent with the history 
and development of the exclusionary rule on both the State and 
Federal levels. The rule should only be applied where it can 
deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, police 
officers conducted the search. They were not under the control 
of the Commission. Their primary goal was arrest and prosecution 
for criminal law violations, not tax law violations. The 
Commission does not punish for violations of criminal laws. 
Thus, the deterrent effect would be highly attenuated if the rule 
were to be applied in this case. 
This Court has never articulated a state exclusionary 
rule for civil cases. Such a rule would be inconsistent with 
existing precedent. This Court should follow other state courts 
and reject the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. 
Zissi has not been compelled to provide self-
incriminating evidence. His arguments fall outside the scope of 
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the incrimination privilege. The Act expressly provides that 
drug dealers need not give their name, address, social security 
number, or other identifying information on drug stamp purchase 
forms. 
Zissi also argues that the tax is cruel and unusual 
punishment. His argument is inconsistent with Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Eighth Amendment has traditionally been used 
to prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment or 
excessive fines in the criminal context. Zissi has failed to 
provide Utah case law in support of an extension of Utah or 
Federal constitutional provisions to the civil arena. 
Zissi's taxes were properly calculated according to the 
statute's language and intent. It is clear as enacted. Zissi 
has the burden of proving that his taxes were improperly 
calculated. He has not met that burden. The statute sets forth 
that amphetamines sold as units are to be taxed as units and not 
by weight. The Commission found that Zissi's amphetamines were 
sold as units. This Court has held that deference should be 
given to administrative agency findings of fact. It is 
irrelevant that Zissi's drugs could face a different taxing 
scheme if they were ground into powder form. 
The statute taxes tablets by dosage units. The 
evidence before the Commission clearly showed that the term 
dosage unit means one tablet. Expert testimony supported the 
-R-
Commission's finding that dosage unit means one tablet. 
Knowledge of the term dosage unit is common with anyone legally-
dealing with drugs. It is self-serving for Zissi to argue that 
because he has no medical background the term dosage unit is 
vague and unclear to him. 
The Act treats Zissi similarly with all other drug 
dealers possessing drugs in tablet form. Even Zissi concedes 
that amphetamines that are in tablet form are sold in tablet 
form. Thus, the Commission was correct in taxing them in tablet 
form. Zissi has failed to make a showing that he has been 
singled out and treated differently than any other drug dealer 
possessing amphetamines in tablet form. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
The Hearing Before the Commission Was a Civil Proceeding. 
The central inquiry to several of the issues presented 
in this proceeding is whether the penalties for violation of the 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101, ("the 
Act") are civil or criminal. That determination will govern what 
procedure applies, and what legal and constitutional standards 
should be used. Case law and rules of statutory construction 
establish that the tax portions of the Act are civil. 
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A. Guidelines for Determining if Penalties Are 
Civil or Criminal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has established guidelines for 
determining if penalties are civil or criminal. See U.S. v. 
Ward/ 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Their approach is sound and should be 
followed by this Court. The question is a matter of statutory-
construction that is analyzed on two levels. Ixi. at 248. Those 
levels, as described by the Court are: 
First/ . . . whether Congress, in establish-
ing the penalizing mechanism, indicated 
either expressly or impliedly a preference 
for one label or the other. Second/ where 
Congress has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired 
further whether the statutory scheme was so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate that intention. In regard to this 
latter inquiry, we have noted that 'only the 
clearest proof could suffice to establish the 
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a 
ground.' 
Id. at 248-9, (emphasis added, citations omitted) (quoting 
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (I960)). 
1. The Act Clearly Implies Both Separate Civil and Criminal 
Penalties. 
Under the first level of inquiry, the Act clearly 
implies that the tax penalties are civil penalties. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-19-103 (Supp. 1988) sets forth the tax amount. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 (Supp. 1988). This is the civil 
portion of the penalty. Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-106(1) 
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establishes a 100% penalty on the unpaid taxes. This is also a 
civil penalty that is to be collected as part of the tax. Id. 
It is clear that these are both civil penalties because 
the subsection immediately following them states: "In addition 
to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing 
marihuana or controlled substances without affixing the 
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a third 
degree felony and is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 . 
. . ." Id. at § 59-19-106(2) (emphasis added). If the 
Legislature had intended the entire statute to impose solely a 
criminal or civil penalty, it would not have distinguished 
between the two by using the "in addition to the tax penalty 
imposed" language. Thus, the legislature clearly expressed a 
separate civil tax assessment. 
2. The Act Is Not So Punitive in Nature as to Negate the Civil 
Penalties. 
In determining whether a statute was "so punitive in 
nature to negate the civil penalties", the Supreme Court in U.S. 
v. Ward, (referring to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 
(1963)), reaffirmed the seven factors, previously established, 
that have "prove[n] helpful in . . . consideration of similar 
questions . . . ." Ward at 249. 
The seven factors as originally set forth in Mendoza-
Martinez are: 
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[1] Whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as 
a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether 
its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment — retribution and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which 
it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and [7] whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the inquiry, and may often point 
in differing directions. 
Mendoza-Martinez at 168-9 (emphasis in original, footnotes 
deleted). 
When these factors are applied, it is clear that the 
Act is more civil in nature than penal. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has found that where both a civil and criminal penalty are found 
in the same statute, that fact dilutes the force of an argument 
that the civil penalty is really a criminal penalty. Ward at 250 
(discussing Helverinq v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (a 50% 
penalty for tax fraud was held to be civil). 
First, no affirmative disability or restraint applies. 
Tax on controlled substances is similar to taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco. See Utah Code Ann. at §§ 59-15-101, 59-16-101, 59-14-
205. Second, there is no case law in support of the proposition 
that payment of tax has historically been viewed as a form of 
criminal punishment. Third, scienter is unnecessary under the 
Act for imposition of taxes. The statute requires 
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"transportation," but not "knowing" transportation for a civil 
tax violation to occur* Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1) (Supp. 
1988). Fourth, the traditional aims of retribution and 
deterrence are not served by the Act. The Act imposes 
statutorily fixed taxes and penalties on specific substances. 
See Utah Code Ann. at § 59-19-103. The taxes are imposed on the 
substances, and are not affected by a criminal conviction for 
distribution of a controlled substance. Fifth, the behavior to 
which the penalty applies is only a crime if the felony and fine 
aspect of § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1988) of the Act is applied. 
That provision is not within the jurisdiction of the Tax 
Commission. The tax is imposed on the substances; it is not 
related to a conviction for distribution of a controlled 
substance. Sixth, assessing a substance that clearly evades 
taxation is a proper legislative function. 
The alternative purpose assigned to the civil penalty 
clearly is not excessive. The South Dakota Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar question in determining if a $750 civil 
penalty was excessive for possession of less than one ounce of 
marijuana. See State v. Barber, 427 N.W.2d 375 (S.D. 1988). 
That court reasoned: 
[W]e find that the civil penalty . . . [for 
possession of marijuana] is not so clearly 
5 
Alternatives to transportation are purchasing, acquiring, or 
importing. Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1) (Supp. 1988). 
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excessive as to bear no relationship to the 
purpose for which it is imposed. Drug abuse 
is a peril to society and particularly to our 
youth. The costs to society in terms of the 
health and mental well-being and lost 
potential of young people involved in such 
activity are incapable of estimation. 
Further, in attempting to curb drug abuse, 
society is required to expend ever increasing 
financial resources in law enforcement and 
drug awareness and prevention campaigns. The 
civil penalty . . . for possession of 
marijuana is of but little recompense to 
society for these costs. 
Id. at 377. 
Only the clearest proof is sufficient to establish 
that the Act is so punitive as to be unconstitutional. Ward at 
249. For these reasons, the Court should conclude that the Act's 
civil penalties are not criminal in nature. Thus, the hearing 
before the Commission was a civil proceeding. 
ISSUE II 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A CIVIL PROCEEDING 
A. Application of the Exclusionary Rule Would Be 
Incorrect in This Case, 
The relief sought by the Petitioner is inconsistent 
with the history and development of the exclusionary rule on both 
the State and Federal levels. The exclusionary rule has never 
been applied to a civil case by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor does 
any precedent from that Court or the Utah Supreme Court exist 
stating that it should be applied to a civil proceeding on the 
state level. 
-14-
1. History and Development of the Exclusionary Rule in the Utah 
State and Federal Courts, 
Prior to the rule's creation, courts would not suppress 
pertinent evidence, although illegally obtained• See Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904). This changed when the 
exclusionary rule was announced in Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 
(1914). The Court reasoned that without this judicial protection 
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures would become meaningless. Ld. at 393. It stated that 
"The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of 
. . . officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Government 
and its agencies." JId. at 398. 
However, because Weeks was not then binding on the 
states, the Utah State Supreme Court expressly rejected its 
application to state court proceedings. State v. Aime, 220 P. 
704, 708 (Utah 1923); see also State v. Fair, 353 P.2d 615 (Utah 
1960). The Utah Court reasoned that this constitutional right 
would be protected by subjecting the individual conducting the 
unreasonable search and seizure "to all consequences and 
penalties provided by law." ][d. at 707. This rationale was 
directly contrary to the federal rule that was not directed at 
"individual misconduct". 
However, this state independence came to an end when 
the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the exclusionary rule would 
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be binding on state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
The underpinnings of that decision were that the exclusionary 
rule would protect "the imperative of judicial integrity" by 
compelling the government to comply with the "charter of its own 
existence". I^ i. at 658-9 (quoting Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 
222 (I960)). In a later case, the Court made clear that 
"[j]udicial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts must 
never admit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." U.S. v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976). 
The Utah State Supreme Court was thus compelled to 
apply the rule it had expressly rejected in Aime. See State v. 
Jasso, 439 P.2d 844 (Utah 1968). 
The rationale of "the imperative of judicial 
integrity," expressed by the Court in Mapp, was later eclipsed by 
a policy of deterrence. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) 
the Supreme Court specified that "[t]he primary justification for 
the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct 
that violates Fourth Amendment Rights." Id. at 486. The Court 
restricted application of the rule "to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
Id. at 487-8 (quoting U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974)). 
In a corresponding footnote, the Court cited a noted 
criminal law commentator! "[T]he rule is a needed, but 
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grud[g]ingly [sic] takenf medicament; no more should be swallowed 
than is needed to combat the disease . . . so many criminals must 
go free as will deter the constables from blundering . . . 
[however] the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on 
the public interest." Stone at 487 n.24 (citing to Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa.L.Rev. 
378, 388-9 (1964)). 
2. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Matters in 
Federal Cases, 
In United States v. Janis, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
asked to apply the exclusionary rule to a tax proceeding. In 
JaniS/ the Los Angeles police obtained a warrant to search 
Janis's residence for bookmaking paraphernalia. ][d. at 434. 
Cash and wagering records were seized. Jd. at 436. A police 
officer informed the IRS of these records. Id. Based on this 
information Janis was assessed wagering taxes. E^d. at 437. The 
IRS levied on Janis's cash that had been seized by the Los 
Angeles Police. Id. 
A subsequent non-federal criminal action was brought, 
where Janis successfully suppressed the evidence seized by the 
Los Angeles Police Department; the judge ordered all items 
returned except the cash levied by the IRS. Id. at 437-8. Janis 
filed for a refund of the cash. .Id. at 438. The IRS denied the 
request and a subsequent U.S. District Court action was filed by 
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Janis where he sought to suppress all evidence from which the 
assessment had been made. Id. 
The Supreme Court held "that the judicially created 
exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the 
civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a 
criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign." Ijd. at 
459-60. The Court expressly stated: "In the complex and 
turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to 
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding/ federal or state." Id. 
at 447 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). The Court expressly 
left the question open of the rules application where 
"intrasovereign" violations have taken place. I_d. at 456. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court weighed the 
"likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police . . . 
[against] the societal costs imposed by the exclusion . . . ." 
Id. at 454. 
The Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the 
exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement 
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or 
against a different sovereign." Id. at 458. The Court went on 
The Court stated: "[t]he seminal cases that apply the 
exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve "intrasovereign" 
violations,[] a situation we need not consider here." Janis at 
456 (footnote omitted). 
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to state: 
This attenuation, coupled with the 
existing deterrence effected by the denial of 
use of the evidence by either sovereign in 
the criminal trials with which the searching 
officer is concerned, creates a situation in 
which the imposition of the exclusionary rule 
sought in this case is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial additional 
deterrence. It falls outside the offending 
officer's zone of primary interest. 
Id, (Emphasis added). 
The Court decided that the societal costs imposed by 
the rule were too severe because "the enforcement of admittedly 
valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary 
rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, concededly 
relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable." 
^d. at 447. 
This appeal is similar to the Janis case. A criminal 
action was brought against Zissi for possession of illegal drugs. 
County law enforcement officers conducted the roadblock. 
However, these law enforcement officers were not being controlled 
by the Commission, nor does the Commission have any authority to 
control their activities. The County is a different sovereign 
than the State Tax Commission. Their relationship is extremely 
attenuated. Application of the rule here is unlikely to provide 
significant or substantial additional deterrence because 
enforcement of tax laws falls outside the arresting officers zone 
of primary interest. 
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In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court resolved any 
questions of application of the exclusionary rule between related 
governments. 
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the issue it had expressly left open in 
Janis: Whether the exclusionary rule applies in a civil case 
involving intrasovereign violations. In Lopez-Mendoza, Lopez-
Mendoza challenged the deportation order of an immigration judge 
because his alien status had come to the attention of officials 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by illegal 
means. Id. at 1034. The Court found that a "deportation 
proceeding is a purely civil action . . . ," id. at 1038, 
although it "is a civil complement to a possible criminal 
prosecution . . . ." Icl. at 1042. The immigration judge could 
not "adjudicate guilt or punish . . . for any crime related to 
unlawful entry into or presence in this country. Consistent with 
the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that 
apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a 
deportation hearing." Id. at 1038. 
The Court, in applying the balancing test of Janis 
concluded that exclusion would not deter the INS from Fourth 
Amendment violations because of a comprehensive scheme by the INS 
to prevent this type of conduct, i^*. at 1046. On the other side 
of the equation, the Court found that the social cost was "both 
unusual and significant." Id. It stated that ongoing violations 
of immigration law would occur, Jd., that the "streamlined" 
deportation hearing would become cumbersome, Id. at 1048, and 
that administration of the exclusionary rule by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals would become costly. Ld. at 1048-9. Thus, 
the Court found the exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil cases 
involving intrasovereign violations where the balancing test of 
Janis is satisfied. 
The Lopez-Mendoza case is substantially similar to this 
appeal. The tax proceedings held before the Commission are 
purely civil actions. They are civil complements to possible 
criminal prosecutions held before a court with proper 
jurisdiction. The Commission may not adjudicate guilt, nor may 
it punish for violations of any criminal drug statutes. 
Consistent with these civil proceedings, it would be 
inappropriate for criminal protections to apply. 
Exclusion of evidence by the Commission would not deter 
county and other law enforcement agencies from Fourth Amendment 
violations. Their primary goal is arrest and prosecution for 
criminal law violations, not tax law violations. Application of 
the rule would have both unusual and significant social costs. 
Evidence of drugs and drug sales that escape taxation would be 
barred, leaving the community to bear the burdens of the social 
ills they cause, Administrative hearings before the Commission 
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would become cumbersome. Additional costs, time requirements, 
and hearings would be required to resolve the issue of 
admissibility and judicial review could be required whenever the 
rule was brought into play. This court should apply the 
reasoning of Lopez-Mendoza and Janis to this case. 
3. Application of the Exclusionary Rule by State Courts, 
This Court should reject Zissi's argument that the 
exclusionary rule should apply in state civil actions. Zissi 
cites no Utah case law in support of his proposition. This Court 
has never articulated a state exclusionary rule for civil cases. 
Some state courts have rejected the application of the 
rule in civil proceedings. Prior to the Mapp decision, that was 
the posture of this Court. See State v. Aime, 220 P. 704, 708, 
(1923). Because Mapp is only applicable in criminal proceedings, 
this Court's decision in Aime should still govern application of 
the exclusionary rule in state civil cases. Aime was not 
overruled, even though Mapp was made applicable on the states and 
became the supreme law of the land in criminal cases. 
The Aime Court expressly rejected the exclusionary rule 
for the following reasons: 
The law cannot be justly administered without 
a knowledge of the facts in dispute. The 
purpose of evidence is to establish the truth 
in legal tribunals, in order that justice may 
be done. The facilities for accomplishing 
this purpose ought not to be diminished 
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without cogent reasons. In determining the 
competency of evidence, the essential test is 
its credibility and its value in discovering 
the truth. 
Aime at 707. For these reasons, this Court should not overrule 
Aime. 
Other state courts have refused to apply the 
exclusionary rule in civil cases. The Supreme Court of Virginia, 
in County of Henrico v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989) held: 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be extended 
from criminal cases to civil cases." Id. at 462. That court 
reasoned that deterrence is not served by the rule because 
"[t]here exists not empirical proof of the exclusionary rule's 
effectiveness." Ici. That court further rejected the rule 
because "[i]t makes reliable and probative evidence unavailable; 
it deflects the truth-finding process; it risks engendering 
disrespect for law by promoting procedure above the fundamental 
search for truth and justice." Id. 
This Court should not expand the exclusionary rule to 
apply to a civil tax proceeding. Zissi's cited federal case law 
is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this appeal. See 
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 13-15 (No. 890317). He argues that 
U.S. v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) holds that the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary is rule applicable in a federal 
civil tax proceeding. That case presents the issues later 
disposed of in Janis. In Blank, IRS agents were the violators of 
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the Fourth Amendment; they were also the party attempting to 
introduce the illegally seized evidence. Blank at 181. Thus, 
the deterrence rationale in that case provided a safeguard for 
violations of the rule. Id., at 182. For these same reasons, 
Vander Linden v. U.S.f 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980) is also 
inapplicable. In that case, the IRS was also the violator of the 
Fourth Amendment and the party attempting to introduce the 
illegally seized evidence. jrd. at 697. Pizzarello v. U.S., 408 
F.2d 579 (2d. Cir. 1969) and Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 
(1972), cited by Zissi, are distinguishable because the 
Commission was not involved in seizing Petitioner's amphetamines. 
Pizzarello arose prior to both Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, when 
" [widespread uncertainty [was] prevalent on the issue of whether 
evidence, inadmissible in a criminal case, can be used for other 
purposes . . . ." Pizzarello at 585. The uncertainties of that 
case have been resolved by Janis and Lopez-Mendoza• Thus, 
Pizzarello has been refined and replaced by these later holdings. 
Suarez likewise does not apply. The Tax Court has 
expressly overruled its holding in Suarez. See Guzzetta v. 
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 2724 (1982). The deterrence rationale, 
articulated in Janis, has made the rule inapplicable under the 
facts of Suarez. 
Zissi also argues that the Act functions similarly to a 
forfeiture proceeding. He claims that One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
-24-
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) should apply. In that case, 
the state asked for the forfeiture of the automobile in question 
as a penalty for the violation of a criminal statute. The 
Pennsylvania statute in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan required an 
alcohol "bootlegger" to forfeit any rights in property used in 
illegal liquor activities such as transportation. Ijd. at 694 
n.2. As noted in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, a forfeiture 
proceeding is instituted, in civil form, for violations of the 
criminal law. Id., at 697. The penalties are affixed to the 
criminal acts and are thus viewed as quasi-criminal in nature. 
Id. 
Zissi argues that since the exclusionary rule applies 
to forfeiture cases which are quasi-criminal, it should also 
apply to drug stamp cases on the grounds that they are quasi-
criminal, the rationale being if the exclusionary rule applies to 
one set of quasi-criminal cases it should apply to all such 
cases. The respondent argues that the reasoning of the 
petitioner is flawed and that the proper test is the two prong 
test expounded in U.S. v. Ward, supra. (See also U.S. v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) for a discussion 
of civil versus criminal sanctions.) 
The Drug Stamp Act does not function as a forfeiture 
case. It brings a civil tax assessment independent of criminal 
drug violations. There is no showing that the Legislature 
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intended the Drug Stamp Act to be criminal and punitive, it is 
clearly a civil sanction. The Act requires purchase and display 
of revenue stamps. The Act taxes a particular activity and 
substances. It does not impose a penalty for violation of a 
criminal law. The Commission does not determine whether there 
has been a criminal conviction, nor must it prove the elements 
necessary for violation of criminal drug statutes. The Act 
functions independently of them. The Commission does not enforce 
criminal law violations; nor do county officials bring civil tax 
proceedings against the violator. This independence between 
civil tax and criminal matters shows that both operate on 
independent grounds and that neither is dependent on the other. 
This is contrary to the operation of a forfeiture proceeding as 
described in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. 
ISSUE III 
ZISSI HAS NOT BEEN COMPELLED TO PROVIDE SELF-
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE 
This Court has held that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination is applicable in civil proceedings if 
a threat of criminal prosecution exists. See Affleck v. Third 
Judicial Dist. Court, 655 P.2d 665, 666 (Utah 1982). 
Zissi has failed to show that his privilege against 
self-incrimination was violated. His argument falls outside the 
scope of the self-incrimination privilege. The Fifth Amendment 
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to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall be 
. . • compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." U.S. Const, amend. V. The Utah State Constitution is 
similar: "In criminal prosecutions . . . [t]he accused shall not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself." Utah Const, art. 
I § 12. 
The Act does not compel self-incriminating information. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, absent coercion, information 
freely given is harmonious with the Fifth Amendment: 
Voluntary statements remain a proper element 
in law enforcement. Indeed, far from being 
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of 
guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are 
inherently desirable . . . absent some 
officially coerced self accusation, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not violated by even 
the most damning admissions. 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1984). Zissi's completion 
of the required forms would have been voluntary and not violative 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
The Act explicitly provides: "Dealers are not required 
to give their name, address, social security number, or other 
identifying information on the form." Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
105(3)(Supp. 1988). Any incriminating evidence would have been 
given voluntarily. There is no showing that incriminating 
information is required; therefore, compulsion is absent for a 
finding of violation of the U.S. or Utah Constitutions. 
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Even if the Act could be viewed as compulsory, the 
information would not incriminate, which is a requirement of 
these constitutional provisions. The purchase of drug stamps is 
a benign act, not a crime. Stamp collectors or anyone else may 
purchase them. Hypothetically, employees of the Commission could 
provide law enforcement officials with a purchaser's physical 
description or automobile license plate number, but that did not 
happen here. Until it does, the court need not address that 
argument. This Court has held that complaints in the abstract 
are insufficient to make a statute unconstitutional. Greaves v. 
State, 528 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah 1984). 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of 
incriminating evidence in Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
In Marchetti, a taxpayer was convicted for failing to pay an 
occupation tax and obtain a revenue stamp. He was convicted of 
failing to complete the IRS form required of all persons in the 
business of accepting wagers. Id at 41. The forms required the 
gambler's residence, business addresses, whether the registrant 
was in the business of accepting wagers, and the names and 
addresses of agents and employees. Id. at 42. The registrants 
were obliged to post the stamp in their place of business, or, if 
they had none, to carry it for display upon demand of a treasury 
officer. Id. at 43. The Statute required that a list of all 
registrants be provided upon the request of any state or local 
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prosecuting officer. JEd. The statute gave no immunity from 
prosecution to registrants. Ijd. at 44. A former Commissioner of 
the IRS "...acknowledged that the Service 'makes available'" to 
law enforcement agencies the names and addresses of those who 
have paid the wagering taxes, and that it is in "full 
cooperation" with the efforts of the Attorney General of the 
United States to suppress organized gambling. JId. at 48. 
The Court based its decision of unconstitutionality on 
the following principles: 
1) The area was permeated with criminal statutes. 
2) Those engaged in the activity were a group 
inherently suspect of criminal activities. 
3) Those required, on pain of criminal prosecution, 
to provide information could reasonably suppose 
that the information given would be made available 
to prosecuting authorities to provide a 
significant link in a chain of evidence that would 
establish guilt. 
4) "The central standard [of] the privilege 
application ... [was] whether the claimant [was] 
confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not 
merely trifling or imaginary hazards of 
incrimination." 
Id. at 47-53. 
The Court concluded that the area of gambling was 
permeated with criminal statutes, and that as a group, those 
accepting wagers were suspect of criminal activity. The Court 
found that the stamps were to be posted conspicuously, and they 
had often been admitted at trial in state and federal gambling 
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prosecutions. It also found that a significant link in a chain 
of evidence existed because the statute required revenue offices 
to provide prosecutors with a list of those paying the tax. A 
former IRS Commissioner admitted that this information was made 
available to federal prosecutors. The Court also concluded that 
the registrants were confronted with real, and not trifling or 
imaginary hazards of incrimination, and the registrants could 
expect prosecution under state gambling laws. 
However, the Court restricted its holding to the facts 
of the case: 
If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is 
not confronted by substantial hazards of 
self-incrimination, or if he is otherwise 
outside the privileges protection, nothing we 
decide today would shield him from the 
various penalties prescribed by the wagering 
statutes. 
Id. at 61. 
There are similarities between Marchetti and Zissi's 
case; however, the distinctions make Marchetti inapplicable. 
Illegal drug dealing is an area permeated with criminal statutes. 
Drug dealers would be a group inherently suspect of criminal 
activities, because their activities are illegal. 
However, the information does not provide a link in the 
chain of evidence. The statute does not require the Commission 
to provide prosecutors with a list of those purchasing the 
stamps; the stamps need not be displayed in open view, nor is 
there any evidence that the stamps have been admitted in a state 
c :i : federal clnni prosecution. Further, Zissi lacks even a 
scintill a of evidence that the Commission Udh I M I HHI k- i
 (" 1 I 
make drug stamp sale information available prosecutors. 
} - - * - -:t •-:." r- ifling or i maginary 
hazards of incrimination, *- opposes - .- substantial urn I red J 
ones ^f Marchettif even though the purchase of the stamps could 
be p. r ••-. t i i M Mil in i I |H vw ided personal 
data or business information, as was required in Marchetti, it 
would have been done at h i s owi :i discretion. The Utah statute 
provide?? "Dealers -*: , 
hrcia. securi' number, other identifying information t •- -
9-105( 
*:i. crimim enforcement agen 
informal i ^ ; ^ Commission, Zssi h^- failed \ > submit 
ftIIic>\A' in i n i i| li il I l i t r n m i i i i s N i o i i has ever provided 
information of drug stamp sales to prosecutors. 
This case i s precisely what the Supreme Court 
Marchett different 
circumstances, ~4 confronted by substantial hazards 
incriminatio - privilege does not appl^ Marchetti at 905. 
The Act preserves \::ii mi i la I::i c i i; :i  I: s h o i i] d 
upheld. 
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Zissi argues that Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 
(1969), applies. However, the Federal Marihuana Act is 
substantially different than the Act at issue here. The Federal 
Act required a dealer to register and give his name and place of 
business to the nearest district office of the Internal Revenue 
Service. Leary at 14. That Act also required all marihuana 
transfers to be registered with the IRS on a form showing the 
name and address of the transferor and transferee and the amount 
of marihuana being transferred, [^d. at 15. This information was 
to be made available to law enforcement officials. Duplicates of 
the forms were to be open to inspection by "Treasury personnel 
and state and local officials charged with enforcement of 
marihuana laws," with the requirement that these officials be 
furnished with copies of the forms. Ijd. As discussed supra, the 
Act fails to make any of these incriminating demands. Thus, 
Leary does not apply. 
ISSUE IV 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 
ARTICLE I § 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARE NOT APPLICABLE 
TO A CIVIL TAX PROCEEDING 
The taxes and penalties of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 
(Supp. 1988) do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The 
issues before the Commission were issues of taxation. While the 
statute provides a criminal penalty, that issue is not before the 
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jurisdiction over these criminal 
matters. 
:i Eighth Amendment has traditionally been used to 
shment oi 
excessive fines : *• •:.. criminal context. See Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651 " ; 
Wh< 
confronted with claims that the Eighth Amendment applies to cases 
outside the criminal area grounds that the penalties were 
cruel and unusual punishmen In inn^pl ralih*. 
Id. at; 66' If As set: forth, above, -.. proceeding before the 
i "omiti iss if if i wii i in |U"oceedin -~ ^ r 4~ * * adopt 
Zissi s position and place taxation within the w e ± , ^JI„.L< i 
limits of the Eighth Amendment would require • :» back 
. 
Zissi has failed to provide any Utah case ] a;w i i : 
support of his argument. His argument should be rejected. 
ISSUE V 
Taxes Were Properly Calculated According to the Statutory Scheme. 
Zissi was properly assessed on: n 1 m I s i ] ] ega ] cii: i igs The 
statute was applied as enacted The fundamental rules governing 
Commi BS ion appl i rati c • " *"lio Act are: ] | any taxes and 
penalties assessed by Commission, pursua 
presumed correct; the taxpayer bears the burden to prove 
otherwise, Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(4) (Supp. 1988); 2) " [i]t 
is the responsibility of the Commission and of the Court to 
interpret and apply the statutes as enacted," McKendrick v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 347 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1959); and 3) doubts as to 
the meaning of terms in tax statutes are to be resolved in favor 
of the taxpayer. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 395 P.2d 57, modified 399 P.2d 145, (Utah 1964). 
The statute is clear as enacted. Utah Code Ann. § 59-
19-103 (Supp. 1988) establishes the tax on controlled substances: 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and 
controlled substances as defined under this 
chapter at the following rates: 
(a) * * * 
(b) on each gram of controlled substance, 
or each portion of a gram, $200; and 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a 
controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000. 
Thus, in applying these provisions, the issue is whether 
amphetamines in pill form are sold by weight or in dosage units. 
This provision of the statute is clear, it requires a factual 
determination on how amphetamines in pill form are sold. Zissi 
has not met his burden of proving otherwise. 
The Commission found that amphetamines, in pill form, 
are sold as pills and not by weight. (R. 7). Deference is given 
to administrative agency findings of fact. Hurley v. Bd. of 
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Review of Indus. Commfn, 767 P. 2d 524 , 527 (Utah 1 988) 7 *"" "* 
c - -^ - * i: supported this finding. Detective Kendra Hurlin 
testified 4 :i< .,iS never seen
 aitlphetamine tat: ] e ts so] ci 1: j 
weigh: * Attorney Loni Deland testified that he did 
iri I IH| iiii<, iiiiiplK t ami ne In, w e i g h t t h a t w e r e 
i . i urn . . 18) Vi)«si"s amphetamines were I i I j d ] ] form. 
Thu: ^~v weic correctly taxed using the i ion • weight assessment 
scl leme. 
It i s irrelevant that these pills would face a 
different ia/ scheme * ~ • existed different physical 
form. ^he* e\ . -. :. 
amphetamine sol . a powder form an altogether different substance 
fails * address 
this difference, Instead he suggests an a I Lernativt; djpiin I. I. • 
the problem. Zissi's approach unworkable; it exalts form over 
mandate on how 
illegal drugs should :- taxed. The Legislature took a common 
sense approach. Drugs marketed in non-weight form (e.g. tablets) 
\ «.„!" i ,1 I, I! " It. n i , x e < I  ii!1". in mi ii in in I "i " i i i l h i s t a n c e s . t i n "nil M M 1 HI »l iiiiiii I'I u n i t w i l l 
be taxed by weigh : is approach should be upheld. 
7 
Where constitutional rights are at stake, a court may exercise 
greater scrutiny. Hurley at 527 n.3. Here, the issue is a 
factual determination of the form of taxation for amphetamines 
sold in pill form. 
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ISSUE VI 
The Term "Dosage Unit" Is Clear and Understandable 
For Due Process Purposes. It Was Correctly 
Interpreted By the Commission. 
Dr. J. Craig Johnson, Director of Pharmacy Services at 
LDS Hospital, and a pharmacist there since 1970, testified that 
"[a] dosage unit would be one tablet." (R. 153). In 
distinguishing a "dosage unit" from a "dosage," he stated that 
"[a] dosage would [be] the amount a person took at one time." 
(R. 153). Exhibit 3 was introduced into evidence in support of 
Dr. Johnson's testimony. (R. 182). It showed that the term 
"unit dose" is the equivalent of "tablet." (R. 182). Zissi has 
attempted to redefine this term. However, he makes no 
understandable distinction between "dosage" and "dosage unit". 
Dr. Johnson further stated that the term dosage unit is 
common parlance in the medical field to mean "the way it comes 
packaged." (R. 155). "Be it one suppository or one tablet." 
(R. 155). The terms dosage unit and unit dose are used 
interchangeably. (R. 156). Thus, the evidence shows that the 
Commission correctly interpreted the Act. 
Zissi argues that the term "dosage units" is unclear 
and so the statute is vague. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 
35 (No. 890317). He argues that the term "dosage unit" really 
means "dosage." See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 39 (No. 
890317). He contends that "[a] person of ordinary intelligence 
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would understand the statute that way, at 3v le goes 
on to say that a dusdiji MHJIII hi '"ill In ^mewhere 
between "50-100 pills.1"" 1«j at 40. This attempt i onfuse an 
*rwise clear statutory provision should be rejected. As Dr. 
Johnson rlearl ;y tes l:i fi eel, a i i I =>i lppor ted 
: '•• - "dosage unit" means "the way something comes 
r suppository or one tablet." 
The statutory language provides a clear, 
understandable standard for assessing drugs As Zissi concedes, 
1 :i :i s ap pi: oacl I c • :: i :i Il d meai I < • tablet s . The 
Commission's interpretation tatute should n.» be replaced 
W i t h Zissi's effort uj confuse it. 
ISSUE VII 
The Ac t operates Equally Upon Each Individual In Each 
Legislatively Designated Class, 
"Equrjl |ii<ii<rfion protects against discrimination 
within a class. State Tax Comm'n v. p e p y t of Fin., 
1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) general principle being that 
"pei HI HI ,.! in i in i si should 1 >e treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as 1 I 
their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
Several factors govern equal protection. First, the 
legislature is given considerable discretion to designate classes 
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as long as these designations operate equally on all persons 
situated similarly. Department of Finance at 1298; see also 
MaIan at 670. Second, when there are differences in treatment, 
"the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Malan at 
670. Administrative convenience has been identified as a valid 
reason for difference in treatment. See Hansen v. Pub. Employees 
Retirement Bd. of Admin., 246 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah, 1952); see 
also Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937). 
The Act establishes three classes of drugs to be taxed: 
1. Marihuana; 
2. Controlled substances sold by weight; and 
3. Controlled substances not sold by weight. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-19-103(1) (Supp. 1988). 
Zissi argues that he is being discriminated against 
because his amphetamines could be ground into powder form and 
taxed as a substance sold by weight. However, the evidence shows 
that amphetamine sold in powder form is a different substance 
than amphetamines sold in tablet form. (R. 159). Zissi fails to 
address the distinction between crystallized amphetamine and that 
in tablet form like he possessed. His argument on amphetamine in 
powder form is misleading. He lumps all amphetamines into one 
class where clearly more than one class exists. 
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Even i £ these substances were identical, the equal 
protec t::i :: i 1 i: u ]| <= s zi t e d s u p i a ii t* i i < nis i f II i MI I *i i I 11 I he Commission's 
application of the Act The Act, situates Zissi similarly with 
all other drug dealers possessing drugs i n tablet form. Th i •> 
group MI dealer i - i i- i r i w i j i l l i i i il i n i l ' iiiiiiiiiii i n i M i i j i i s i q i > 
units tah /ode Ann. §59-19-103 . (Supp. 1988 
] mation operates equal dealers ^- r -
drugs , ui.it. , , .L,L . concedes \: 
by the pil l c • quanti ! • vi JI B when ; J f '^ rr . 5 
P*- 89031 Thus, Ziss: * 
drugs should be taxed according & ^ t p .. . . i lu i 
sold as units. 
Thin'/1" ! Ii r 't:je s e p a r a t.f " I ••isiir'.'-'i e s t a b I i s h e r l I >y t h e 
legislature distinguish between marihuana, drugs sold by weight 
and drugs sold in unit1-" ,». ' drug dealers within these classes 
are treated similarly "I ',« -Ji n , IIM Itii s \ * ' , P '..'fin 
class The differences between these classes allow the taxation 
objectives >±. uiie statute * accomplished. Without these 
classifications , the stat. I I M ' i iii| n i :i h 11 J J i' I • 111 III i 111 ii I tj r . 
Clearly these classifications accomplish the legislative purpose 
c III I 11 >. mi mi i | i I 1 IMII j 11II " u b s t a n c e s . 
Zissi argues that he is being treated as e 
Insurance Fund was State Tax Comm'n v. Dep't of Fin.f supra. 
r
 singled out from among all 
other insurers to bear a special tax. Zissi has failed to make a 
showing that he has been singled out and treated differently than 
any other drug dealer possessing amphetamines in tablet form. 
Thus, he has failed to show a due process violation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission correctly interpreted the Drug Stamp Act 
in determining the tax and penalty that is due and owing. 
The Commission further asserts that the matter is a 
civil matter not subject to the exclusionary rule, that there is 
no showing of a violation of petitioner's right against self-
incrimination or his being subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
Finally, this Court should uphold the constitutionality 
of the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-19-101, et 
seq., and affirm the order of the Commission. 
DATED this (k day of January, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
L.A. DEV^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed; which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence. 
1 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
APPENDJI X A 
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 59-19-103 
CHAPTER 19 
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 
Section 
59-19-101. 
59-19-102. 
59-19-103. 
59-19-104. 
59-19-105. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Tax imposed on marihuana and 
controlled substances. 
Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be 
provided and sold by the com-
mission. 
Stamps to be affixed to mari-
huana and controlled substance 
Section 
59-19-106. 
59-19-107. 
— Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps. 
Civil penalty — Criminal penalty 
— Statute of limitations — Bur-
den of proof. 
Commission to administer tax — 
No criminal immunity for 
dealers. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1988, ch. 11, 
§§ 1 to 14, also enacted a new § 59-19-101 et 
seq. Because of the enactment of § 59-19-101 
et seq. by Laws 1988, ch. 246, §§ 1 to 7, the 
provisions enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 11, were 
renumbered as § 59-20-101 et seq. 
59-19-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act." 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-101, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, { 1. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real 
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, trans-
ported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. It 
does not include marihuana. 
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufac-
tures, produces, ships, transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner 
acquires or possesses more than A2xk grams of marihuana, or seven or 
more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of 
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight. 
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as 
defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, trans-
ferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 246, t 2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-103. Tax imposed on marihuana and controlled sub-
stances. 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined 
under this chapter at the following rates: 
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3.50; 
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APPENDIX B 
59-19-1 :: i REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram, 
$200; and 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000. 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quantity of 
marihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the 
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the 
substance is not sold by weight, in the dealer's possession. A quantity of a 
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quantity of pure 
controlled substance and any excipients or fillers. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 3. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-104. Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be provided and 
sold by the commission. 
(1) The commission shall adopt a uniform system
 0f providing, affixing, and 
displaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for mari-
huana and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed. 
(2) A dealer may not possess any marihuana or controlled substance upon 
which a tax is imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the 
marihuana or other controlled substance as evidenced by a stamp or other 
official indicia. 
(3) Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be affixed to all marihuana or 
controlled substances shall be purchased from the commission. The purchaser 
shall pay 100% of face value for each stamp, label, or other indicia at the time 
of the purchase. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-104, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - - Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 4, makes the act effective on April 1, 1988, 
59-19-105. Stamps
 w oe affixed to marihuana and con-
trolled substance — Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps. 
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this state 
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall permanently affix the official 
indicia on the marihuana or controlled substances evidencing the payment of 
the tax required under this chapter. No stamp or other official indicia may be 
used more than once. 
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or controlled substances by this chapter 
are due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this state 
by a dealer. 
(3) Payments required by this chapter shall be made to the commission on 
forms provided by the commission. Dealers are not required to give their 
name, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information on 
the form The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this chapter 
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ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT 59-19.107 
History: C. 1953,59-19-105, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 246, I 5. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penalty — Statute of 
limitations — Burden of proof. 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the 
tax in addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-103. The penalty shall be 
collected as part of the tax. 
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possess-
ing marihuana or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate 
stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a felony of the third degree and is 
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the criminal laws of this state, 
an information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal 
offense under this chapter within six years after the commission of this of-
fense. 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be 
valid and correct. The burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or 
invalidity. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 246, i 6. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-107. Commission to administer tax — No criminal 
immunity for dealers. 
(1) The commission shall administer this chapter and may adopt rules nec-
essary to enforce this chapter. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in possession of mari-
huana or a controlled substance to pay the tax required under this chapter. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter provides immunity of any kind for a dealer from 
criminal prosecution under Utah law. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-107, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 246, I 7. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
CHAPTER 20 
ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT 
Section Section 
59-20-101. Short title. 69*20-107. 
59-20-102. Definitions. 59*20-108. 
59-20-103. Powers of the Department of 59*20-109. 
Community and Economic De- 59*20-110. 
velopment. 59-20-111. 
59-20-104. Criteria for designation of enter- 59-20-112. 
prise tones — Application. 
59-20-105. Qualifying local contributions — 59-20-113. 
Employee categories. 59-20-114. 
59-20-106. Eligibility review. 
Quarterly consideration. 
Duration of designation. 
Contingent designations. 
Revocation of designations. 
Disqualifying transfers. 
Businesses qualifying for tax in-
centives. 
State tax credits. 
Annual report. 
145 
45 
